Abstract. This article presents a political-economy analysis of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). A common-agency model suggests that a politicalsupport maximizing government considers the preferences of sectoral interest groups besides public interest when allocating emissions permits. In the stylized model, industries represented by more powerful lobby groups face a lower regulatory burden, which for sufficiently high lobbying power leads to an inefficient emissions regulation. An empirical analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS corroborates our theoretical prediction for a cross-section of German firms, but also reveals that the political-economy determinants of permit allocation are more complex. We find that large carbon emitters that were heavily exposed to emissions regulation and simultaneously represented by powerful interest groups received higher levels of emissions allowances. In contrast, industrial lobbying power standalone or threats of potential worker layoffs did not exert a significant influence on the EU ETS allocation process.
Introduction
The central instrument of Europe's current climate policy is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which was established in 2005 and enters its second trading period in 2008 (EU, 2003) . Aiming at emissions reductions at least cost, the EU ETS was celebrated as a "new grand policy experiment" already before its implementation (Kruger and Pizer, 2004) .
However, the actual implementation of the EU ETS suggests that due to a generous allowance allocation to covered industries, the induced emissions abatement is rather limited. This paper investigates whether the permit allocation design in the EU ETS is representing public interest in terms of economic efficiency or can be explained by the presence of sectoral interest groups.
The outspoken objective of the EU ETS is to achieve Europe's greenhouse gas emissions reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol at minimal cost through the tradability of emissions rights (or likewise abatement efforts) across major emissions sources. The EU ETS covers more than 10,000 energy-intensive installations that belong to mainly five industrial sectors: power, heat and steam generation; oil refineries; iron and steel production; mineral industries (e.g. cement, lime and glass); pulp and paper plants (EU 2003) . Each Member State is obligated to set up a National Allocation Plan (NAP) where it defines the cap on emissions allowances for sectors (installations) included in the trading scheme and the specific allocation rule for grandfathering, i.e. the entitlement with free pollution rights based on historical emissions.
Standard economic theory suggests that the introduction of market-based instruments of environmental policy -such as (uniform) emissions taxes or (auctioned) tradable emissions allowances -can generate cost-efficient emissions reductions by equalizing marginal abatement costs across polluters. However, over the last decades the implementation of environmental taxes in industrialized countries most commonly implied a differentiation of tax rates between sectors (OECD, 2007) . On efficiency grounds, also the free allowance allocation in the EU ETS has been criticized for its generous and differential treatment of regulated industries, as well as its incomplete sectoral coverage. This invokes scientific interest in the role of lobbying for the observed allocation pattern across sectors: Can the power of sectoral interest groups explain the differential treatment of EU industries in the entitlement with free emissions permits? If lobbying for emissions allowances is effective, can it induce economic inefficiencies by shifting the economic burden of emissions abatement to those sectors excluded from emissions trading? While a number of studies on the economic impacts of EU ETS regulation indicate the existence of such a burden shifting (see Kallbekken, 2005; or Peterson, 2006) , its rationale has remained implicit to date.
The lacking welfare-economic explanation for the observed regulatory design represents the initiation of our political-economy analysis of the EU ETS. Building on Olson's (1965) theory of the formation and power of interest groups, positive theories have presented alternative approaches to study the political-economy determinants of policy outcomes (see Oates and Portney, 2003 for the context of environmental policy). As a prominent example, rent-seeking models describe how interest groups compete for group-specific rents (Tullock 1980) , specifically in the context of environmental instrument choice (Dijkstra 1998) . Moreover, models of information transfer describe the exchange of truthful information between interest groups and policy makers, upon which politicians base their decisions (Grossman and Helpman 2001 , Naevdal and Brazee 2000 , Potters and van Winden 1992 .
Previous studies on political-economy determinants of environmental taxation include Frederiksson (1997) and Aidt (1997 Aidt ( , 1998 who investigate the implications of international competition and revenue recycling for the design of environmental tax reforms. In this context, Anger et al. (2006) provide a first combined theoretical and empirical analysis of the role of interest groups in environmental tax differentiation. They show that a sectoral differentiation of green tax reforms is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced environmental tax rates, but also by the groups' interest in revenue rebates to labor. The existing political-economy literature on emissions regulation by tradable permits focuses on the choice between free permit allocation based on historic emissions levels and auctioning of pollution rights. Hanoteau (2005) theoretically shows that in the presence of interest groups an environmental regulator prefers a free allocation of permits over auctioning, and relaxes the underlying emissions cap. Markussen and Svendsen (2005) argue that dominant industrial lobby groups influenced the corresponding EU ETS directive towards a grandfathered allocation rule, thereby affirming Hanoteau's (2005) findings. Analyzing data from the first EU ETS trading phase, also Buchner et al. (2006) mention the presence of industrial lobby groups in order to explain the political allocation process. Hanoteau (2003) empirically shows that political influence by means of financial campaign contributions affected the distribution of permits within the U.S. sulphur emissions trading system.
The present paper tries to complement the political-economy analysis of the EU ETS with an explicit and combined theoretical and empirical assessment of the role of interest groups in the EU emissions trading system by providing a twofold contribution: First, we develop a stylized common-agency model for the allocation of emissions allowances in a cap and trade system, where the regulator values political contributions from sectoral interest groups when determining the stringency of allowance allocation. Second, we test the predictions of our analytical model with an empirical analysis on the political-economy determinants of permit allocation in the EU ETS for a large cross section of regulated firms in Germany. To our best knowledge we thereby provide the first econometric assessment of the role of interest groups in the EU ETS.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop a politicaleconomy model for the allocation of emissions allowances in a cap and trade system. In section 3, we present our empirical analysis of the determinants of permit allocation in the EU ETS. In section 4, we conclude.
A political-economy model of emissions regulation
In this section we present a simple analytical model of the role of interest groups for the allocation of emissions allowances in a cap and trade system. The model is structured as a common-agency problem, in which principals (interest groups) aim to induce an action from an agent (the government). As introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1994) In order to analyze the firm's behavior on the emissions market, we build on the one-sector partial equilibrium model by assessing emissions-based allocation rules in cap-and-trade systems. In our model we consider an emissions-constrained economy with two production sectors
, one of which is regulated by an emissions trading scheme (ets) while the other is excluded from the scheme (nets). Sectoral The political process involves an incumbent government (i.e. an environmental regulator) and an industrial lobby group that represents the sectoral (i.e. firms') interests. Motivated by current EU emissions regulation, we assume the formation of interest groups only for the covered ets sector, while the nets industry does not feature lobbying activities. We base this assumption on the fact that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme covers mainly energyintensive industries and represents the dominant instrument of environmental regulation for these sectors. In contrast, the remaining segments of EU economies (e.g. the transport sector or households) are subject to a more diverse set of environmental policy instruments (such as energy taxes or subsidies). Besides their single-targeted motive of lobbying for free emissions allowances, energy-intensive industries also feature a relatively high degree of concentration, which according to Olson (1965) should enable a better organization of interests by overcoming the problem of free-riding.
Motivated by Grossman and Helpman (1994) , in the model the lobby group can offer a set of political contributions ( ) ets K α to the government depending on the envisaged policy decision.
In our context, sectoral contributions are thus a function of the allocation factor. Political contributions may either represent monetary campaign contributions by interest groups or a more general form of political support, such as information transfer between interest groups and policy makers (Grossman and Helpman 2001) . In our analysis we abstract from interest group formation and behavior and thus focus on the political equilibrium in which lobby contributions reflect the true preferences of interest groups. 
Emissions regulation and firm behavior
While condition (1) states that given the firm's behavior the marginal benefit of sectoral production equals its social cost, condition (2) 
Analogously to the first-order conditions in the ets sector, condition (3) states that the marginal benefit of nets production equals its social cost, while condition (4) implies that the marginal cost of emissions abatement equals the value of the emissions tax. 
Emissions regulation in the presence of lobbying
The problem of the incumbent government is to maximize its political support. To this aim it values the level of political contributions by interest groups besides social welfare (the latter suggesting that a higher standard of living increases the chances for reelection). The regulator thus maximizes a weighted sum of contributions and welfare given an environmental constraint (i.e. the total emissions target) by choosing the allocation factor for ets sectors and the emissions tax for nets industries: In this framework, the government maximizes a social-welfare function that weights sectors represented by a lobby group with the weight 1+θ and the remaining members of society with the (smaller) weight of θ . This formulation of the political-support function implies no restriction on the value of the parameter θ .
2 Obviously, the higher the value of θ , the higher the regulator values social welfare in comparison to political contributions by interest groups (the regulator fully ignores lobby contributions in the extreme case of θ → ∞ , whereas she only cares about political contributions for a θ equal to zero).
In the following, we analyze the regulatory behavior of the government in terms of allowance allocation and emissions taxation. for two cases: the absence and the presence of interest groups. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier as λ yields the following first-order conditions for the government:
2 Grossman and Helpman (1994) state that one could alternatively formulate the government's objective function 
In the absence of lobbying the regulator maximizes social welfare. Analogously, the welfaremaximizing emissions tax can be derived based on the firm's first order conditions (3) and (4):
b) Presence of lobbying: ( ) 0
In the presence of lobbying for emissions allowances by the ets sector, implicit differentiation of the government's objective function w.r.t. the allocation factor yields: 
From this first-order condition of the government we can derive the allocation factor that maximizes its political support: 
Condition (7) shows that in the political equilibrium the allocation factor depends on three policy-relevant factors: the government's weight on welfare relative to political contributions θ , the stringency of the environmental constraint λ , and marginal political contributions by the lobby group '( ) ets K α . Likewise, implicit differentiation of the government's objective function w.r.t. the emissions tax yields:
emissions tax only through the government's weight on social welfare relative to political contributions.
In the following, we analyze the efficiency implications of the political equilibrium regarding the allocation of allowances in greater detail.
Efficiency implications of lobbying
In order to analyze how the political-support maximizing behavior of the government in the presence of lobbying affects the economic efficiency of emissions regulation, we compare the welfare-maximizing allocation factor, as given in (5), with the allocation factor that maximizes the political support for the government, as given in (7). It shows that:
We find that if and only if marginal political contributions exceed the threshold value on the right-hand side of condition (9), the political-support maximizing allocation factor results in a higher level than the welfare-maximizing allocation factor. This suggests that if the ets sector's interest group is able to increase political contributions to a sufficiently large extent given a higher allocation factor (i.e. if the lobby group is sufficiently strong), the regulator implements an inefficiently high allowance allocation. More specifically, as the firm behavior in the previous section implies that marginal political contributions are ever positive, condition (9) states that for 1 θ = the regulator will always implement an inefficiently high allocation factor in the presence of lobbying. This is the case when the government values social welfare and political contributions from interest groups equally.
The government's environmental constraint immediately suggests that a higher allocation factor for the ets sector translates into higher emissions from this segment of the economy, which, ceteris paribus, increases the emissions reduction requirements for the nets sector in order to achieve the overall emissions target E . Condition (2) implies that larger emissions reductions by the nets sector require the implementation of increased emissions taxation.
Proposition 1: If a political-support maximizing government values social welfare and political contributions from interest groups equally high, the presence of lobbying induces an inefficient emissions regulation. The structure of allowance allocation
We finally assess the sub-sectoral distribution of allocated allowances within the emissions trading scheme. To this aim we describe the ets sector as being composed of s = 1…S subsectors, each of which is represented by an industrial lobby group. Political contributions at the sub-sectoral level depend on a sub-sectoral allocation factor and are given by ( ) s s K α . The political equilibrium within the ets sector can be derived analogously to condition (7) by profit maximization in the respective sub-sectors and the political-support maximizing behavior of the government on the aggregate sectoral level.
In the following, we analyze comparative statics in the resulting political equilibrium.
Considering two sub-sectors 1 and 2, we can assess the determinants of allowance allocation within the emissions trading scheme:
We find that -ceteris paribus -the sub-sectoral allocation factor is higher and thus regulatory stringency lower for sub-sectors of the emissions trading scheme featuring (i) higher marginal cost of emissions abatement, (ii) higher current and lower historical output levels, and (iii) lower emissions rates. As 0 (2)), for a sufficiently small government's weight on social welfare relative to political contributions (i.e. / θ λ σ < ) the sub-sectoral allocation factor is also higher for industries featuring (iv) higher marginal contributions of sub-sectoral interest groups. 3 Result (iv) implies that sub-sectors represented by lobby groups which are able to increase political contributions to a larger extent for a higher sub-sectoral allocation factor (i.e. that are more powerful) face a lower regulatory burden. As the allocation factor represents the fraction of historical emissions freely allocated as allowances, our theoretical analysis predicts that firms belonging to industries that are represented by a more powerful lobby also receive a higher level of allowance allocation lead to allocation factor differences within the emissions trading scheme but also to economic inefficiencies in the overall emissions regulation as laid out above. 
Empirical assessment: Emissions trading in Germany
In this section we present an empirical assessment of the determinants of EU ETS emissions allowance allocation at the German firm level in order to test our central theoretical prediction of the previous section. At present, the EU ETS exclusively covers installations in energyintensive sectors (such as electricity, iron and steel, or paper and pulp), while the remaining industries of EU economies (such as households or the transport sector) have to be regulated by complementary abatement policies in order to meet the countries' overall emissions targets. The EU ETS prescribes the (mainly free) allocation of emissions allowances to installations according to historic levels by means of National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of the respective Member States, specifying an overall cap in emissions for the covered sectors. Our regression analysis particularly aims at investigating the role of interest groups for the allowance allocation design of the first trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
Data and variables
For the empirical analysis, we use a unique economic and environmental cross-sectional data set for Germany at the firm level. It is a data compilation based on three different sources:
First, we employ the CREDITREFORM database, an economic database of German firms, from which we selected those firms regulated by the EU ETS (see Appendix A.1 for details of the data base). In this respect, it should be noted that Germany is the most important country within the EU ETS in terms of carbon emissions, its companies representing roughly a quarter of all allowances allocated. Second, we make use of a data set on verified emissions and EU transfer. In addition, we employ two interaction terms of the lobby variable. The corresponding descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 . Table 3 in the Appendix underpins that these two variables are strongly interrelated.
ETS
As a further potential determinant of allowance allocation within the EU ETS, the CREDITREFORM database reports the number of employees at the firm level. Here, we can The central explanatory variable of our political-economy analysis is the number of lobby employees of the representative industrial association in each sector, which we use as a proxy measure for lobbying power (see Table 5 
Methodology
For our cross-sectional analysis, we depart from the ordinary least squares estimator (OLS) for equation:
with y i representing allowances allocated of firm i, x i being the vector of explanatory variables of the respective firm as presented in the previous section, and β giving the vector of coefficients to be estimated. ε i is a disturbance term that is independent and identically distributed across firms N i ,..., 2 , 1 = . Using OLS, the parameter vector is determined by:
where matrix X consists of rows x i ', and y is the dependent variable's vector. While OLS serves as the starting point for our empirical analysis, it does not take into account the important issues of potential reverse causality, making robustness checks an all-important issue for our empirical analysis.
Within the OLS approach, reverse causality problems may cause a severe bias for parameter estimation. As lined out in the preceding chapter, firm data on historical emissions is not 
Given this, the 2SLS estimator for the parameter vector γ can be written as.
[ ]
where matrix X* consists of rows x i * (first stage regression fitted values for endogenous explanatory, i.e. emissions variables, and exogenous explanatory variables, respectively). In the 2SLS approach, for instrumental variables to be valid two prerequisites have to hold: correlation between z i and the endogenous variable to be instrumented should be nonnegligible, while z i and the second-stage error term (ε i from equation (13) In the following, we estimate two different specifications in order to explain EU ETS allowance allocation at the German firm level: specification (1), which is consistent with our theoretical analysis as laid out in section 2 of this paper, and a more extensive specification 5 We have also employed outlier-robust regression in order to avoid parameter estimates being heavily influenced by a minority of observations that is drawn from a different regime than the majority (cp. Cook, 1979 , or Temple, 2000 . The Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRLS) Estimator is the most common method of outlier robust regression; its parameter vector is determined within an iterative solution of 
Estimation results
Our quantitative estimation results, presented in Table 1 , suggest that specification (1) gives a very good fit to our data set, as shown by a very high R-squared for both econometric techniques used. This is due to the fact that the EU ETS allocation procedure is mainly based on historical emissions, so that the verified emissions of the firms analyzed here have very strong explanatory power for the allowances allocated. This also manifests in a high statistical significance of the respective coefficient (at the 1%-level for each estimation technique).
Accordingly, also the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all explanatory variables can be rejected at the 1%-level (F-Test). The positive sign of the estimated coefficient of the verified emissions variable corresponds to the nature of the EU ETS allocation process, which suggests that emissions levels have a positive impact on the level of allowance allocation. In contrast, the estimated coefficient for the variable indicating the number of lobby employees is not significant at any conventional level, a result that does not support our theoretical findings from section 2. This holds for both estimation techniques applied. The estimated coefficient for the lobby variable does neither alter substantially when the variable is instrumented. According to an F-Test, first stage regression of the lobby variable on the instruments (as outlined above) is well specified, as the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all explanatory variables can be rejected at any conventional levels (see Table 4 of the Appendix). ( In specification (2), we consider further variables for the estimated equation. We first include the squared term of the verified emissions variable in order to control for nonlinearities in the relationship between emissions and the allocation process. Second, we introduce a variable representing the number of employees at the firm level. The number of employees could be seen as an influential factor for emissions allowance allocation if adverse employment impacts of the EU ETS regulation have played a role within the allocation process. Third, we incorporate interaction terms of the lobby variable with both verified emissions and the number of employees. This reflects the idea that lobby power can influence the allocation process only in combination with specific arguments or economic characteristics of the respective industries: in our case, a high political-economic importance (in terms of a large number of employees) and a high exposure to environmental regulation (in terms of a high emissions level). 6 The application of an F-Test reveals that for both econometric approaches (OLS and 2SLS) the estimated coefficients for the additional variables jointly enter with a high significance into the regression equation. In the following we consequently focus our empirical analysis on the estimation results from specification (2), as specification (1) may suffer from the omission of influential explanatory variables.
Using OLS, the estimated verified emissions coefficient remains highly significant also for specification (2). Moreover, also the squared term of the emissions variable enters highly significantly into the estimated regression equation. Its negative sign suggests a concave relationship between verified emissions and allowances allocated. The estimated coefficients of all other explanatory variables (including the lobby-related interaction terms) are not significant at any conventional level.
In this respect, results from the 2SLS estimation are however in contrast to our standard OLS results. Besides the verified emissions variable and squared verified emissions, also the interaction term between lobby and emissions variable is instrumented here (note that as before, there is no evidence for any misspecification of the first stage regression according to the results presented in Table 4 ). According to these estimation results, also the coefficient of the interaction term between the lobby variable and verified emissions is highly significant and positive under 2SLS, the preferred technique for our setting. 7 This suggests that the combination of high emissions at the firm level and powerful lobbying activities in the respective sector induced higher levels of allocated allowances for German firms in the EU ETS. However, given the insignificant coefficients of the lobby variable itself, the employment variable and the employment-lobbying interaction term, these 2SLS estimation results suggest that lobbying only affected the allowance allocation positively for large emitters. Put differently, we find that in the EU ETS industrial arguments against environmental policy that were directly linked to firm exposure to emissions regulation played a more critical role than more indirect issues such as a political-economic importance in terms of sectoral employment levels.
Our empirical analysis thus corroborates our theoretical Proposition 2 in the previous section which suggested a positive impact of sub-sectoral lobbying power on allowance allocation, but also indicates that the political-economy determinants of permit allocation in the EU ETS follow a more complex pattern than outlined in our stylized model framework. Moreover, 7 Note that the magnitude of the (highly significant) estimated coefficient of the emissions variable for 2SLS is smaller than for OLS estimation, which may be a sign of actual reverse causality of the emissions variable, as one would expect the effect of allowances allocated on verified emissions to be positive. For this case, i.e. that "over-allocation" led to higher actual emissions and more stringent allowance allocation led to more abatement, OLS would over-estimate the impact of verified emissions on allowances allocated. Such a bias can be eliminated using the 2SLS technique.
besides our empirical finding on the important role of lobbying for the allowance distribution within the EU ETS, in combination with Proposition 2 the estimation results suggest that considerable sub-sectoral lobbying activities were able to induce inefficiencies in the overall allocation design.
Conclusions
This paper assessed the political-economy aspects of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) both on theoretical and empirical grounds. We This does not only lead to distributional impacts within the emissions trading scheme, but for sufficiently high lobbying power can induce overall inefficiencies of emissions regulation: the political-support maximizing government implements an inefficiently high aggregate allowance allocation and shifts the abatement burden to those sectors excluded from emissions trading. As a consequence, these industries have to be regulated by a higher emissions tax in order to fulfill the national emissions target.
An empirical analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS affirms this theoretical prediction for a cross-section of German firms, but shows that the political-economy determinants of allowance allocation are more complex. Employing instrumental variable estimation technique, we do not find stand-alone lobbying effects on the overall number of allocated emissions allowances. However, we show that particularly large emitters represented by stronger German industrial associations were allocated significantly higher levels of allowances in the EU ETS. Our empirical analysis thus shows that the political impact of lobbying is more complex issue than outlined in our stylized theoretical framework.
While a powerful interest group alone did not help the respective firms to influence the allocation process in their favor, lobbying paid off in combination with the political argument of exposure to emissions regulation. According to our analysis, these industrial arguments against environmental policy that were directly linked to emissions regulation played a more critical role than more indirect issues such as a political-economic importance in terms of sectoral employment levels. Together with the propositions from our theoretical model, these empirical results offer an explanation for the potential abatement burden shifting to sectors outside the EU ETS. According to our estimation results, EU ETS sectors represented by more powerful interest groups have on the hand benefited from a preferential allocation of emissions allowances compared to other ETS sectors. On the other hand, these lobbying activities were able to lower the abatement burden of the EU ETS as a whole at the expense of overall economic efficiency.
Suggesting that industrial lobbying has played a crucial role for emissions allocation at the German level, our results corroborate the existing critique on the allocation process of the EU ETS. The findings of both our theoretical and empirical analysis thus provide arguments in favor of the use of auctioning instead of a grandfathered allowance allocation. The claim for an increased use of auctioning in emissions trading systems has, up to now, been mainly based on theoretical arguments concerning the reduction of tax distortions, the enhanced provision of innovations, and the elimination of potential lobbying influence (Cramton and Kerr, 2002 
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